











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission.  
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  This document comments on the draft EU Regulation on gas supply security as it was on 
3rd July 2009. The relevant draft of the Regulation is included as an annex following page 7 
of this document. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
We fully support the Commission’s goal of ensuring that all Member States devise and 
implement appropriate gas supply security policies. The draft Regulation contains many 
valuable provisions and certainly goes in the right direction. Though this note focuses on 
what we think is wrong with the text we have received, it is meant to be constructive advice to 
help the Commission achieve its goals. 
We have three main points and recommendations: 
I.  There are two conflicting approaches in the draft Regulation: (1) a supply security rule that 
all member states have to comply with irrespective of their national situation (ensuring gas 
supplies to ‘protected customers’ for 60 days in N-1 situation); (2) ‘national preventive 
action plans’ based on an assessment of the risks faced by each member state. We think 
that the Commission should abandon the ‘N-1 for 60 days’ rule; it should mandate 
independently carried out and peer-reviewed national risk assessments, on the basis of 
which the Commission would negotiate legally binding national gas security action plans. 
II.  The notion of ‘ensuring gas supplies to protected customers’ is flawed. The Commission 
should abandon it in favour of ‘meeting contracted final energy demand in case of gas 
supply disruption’. 
III.  The formula for calculating the ‘N-1’ indicator is flawed. If the Commission wants to retain 
this tool (which we advise it not to do) the formula should be revised. 
  1I.  FROM ‘60 DAYS IN N-1’ TO NATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS 
The core of the proposed Regulation lies in articles 4 (National Preventive Action Plans), 5 
(Security of Supply Standard) and 6 (Risk Assessment). 
-  Articles 4 and 6 define an approach based on national risk assessments and national 
action plans; 
-  Article 5 defines a rule that all member states would have to comply with. Article 5, 
paragraph 1 is extremely difficult to understand. The rule as we understand it is the 
following: Member States should be able to supply gas to protected customers for 60 
days in case of failure of the largest infrastructure in the system, or extreme weather 
conditions. 
How these three articles interact with each-other is far from clear. We believe that there is a 
juxtaposition of two different, mutually incompatible approaches to mandating a minimum 
level of security of gas supply. The ‘N-1 for 60 days’ rule is a poor substitute for a proper 
analysis of the gas supply disruption risks faced by member states; the approach suggested by 
articles 4 and 6 should be preferred over the rule defined in article 5. 
National gas supply systems differ widely across Europe and so do the nature of the supply 
disruption risks, including the probability of disruptions, their severity and length. This large 
variety makes it difficult to justify a given number of days of ‘insurance’ imposed uniformly 
on all member states. The case of Estonia is a good illustration of this. 
-  Estonia receives all its gas through a pipeline from Russia in the summer and, in the 
winter, through another pipeline from Latvia where gas is stored by Gazprom. There 
is a third pipeline from Russia in the north of the country which is no longer used. 
The unavailability of the incoming ‘summer’ pipeline would probably not lead to a 
supply disruption at all as gas could be re-directed through the northern pipeline. The 
unavailability of the ‘winter’ pipeline from Latvia would lead to a total (or near-total) 
disruption of supply lasting from a few days to a few weeks. The unavailability of the 
Latvian storage would lead to a total (or near-total) disruption of supply lasting for 
several months, potentially the entire winter. 
As far as short-term gas security is concerned the key question for Estonia is whether 
or not to insure against the low-probability, high-impact event of a storage failure in 
Latvia. The ‘N-1 for 60 days’ rule would leave the country significantly under-insured 
if the Latvian storage is included in the N-1 calculation, and significantly over-insured 
if one excludes it. 
Generally speaking, for countries with non-diversified gas supply systems, the cost of 
insuring against N-1 could be very high. Therefore it is extremely important to know if the 
probability of failure is closer to 0.001 (in which case one may decide not to insure against 
  2failure of the largest infrastructure) or 0.01, and whether likely disruptions would last a few 
days (in which case 60 days is too much) or 6 months (in which case 60 days is too little). 
This is precisely what the national risk assessments are supposed to reveal. The rule cannot 
come before the risk assessment, as articles 4 and 6 seem to suggest, as the enforcement of 
such a rule defeats the purpose of the risk assessment, which is to define what member states 
should rationally insure against. 
It is not sensible to impose a standard (60 days in ‘N-1’) that, for most countries if not all, will 
lay in the thin tail of the probability distribution curve for gas supply disruptions. It is bound 
to be fiercely resisted by member states on the ground (justified in many cases) that the 
‘insurance policy’ the Commission forces them to buy does not fit the nature and intensity of 
the risks they face. 
Recommendation 
We recommend that the Commission refrains from imposing a rule such as ‘60 days in N-1’, 
that is bound to leave some member states under-insured while it will be massive over-
insurance for others. Instead the Commission should opt for a mandatory, independent and 
peer-reviewed risk analysis of the national gas supply system, on the basis of which it would 
enter into a negotiation with each member state over a legally binding national action plan 
for gas security. 
We understand and share the Commission’s legitimate concern to have a Regulation that, 
unlike 2004/67, really ‘bites’. There probably needs to be some creative legal thinking to 
design a process for elaborating legally binding national (or sub-regional in some cases) 
action plans that fully reflect system specificities. The Commission could look at the process 
for establishing the National Allocation Plans for emission allowances for inspiration. 
  3II.  FROM ‘PROTECTED CONSUMERS’ TO ‘CONTRACTED ENERGY 
DEMAND’ 
Like 2004/67, the draft Regulation concentrates on households as the category of gas 
consumers that governments should make sure are insured against gas supply disruption. 
(We know from our conversation of 11 June that the Commission wonders whether this 
should be extended to other categories such as the service sector or electricity generators.) 
There are several problems with this approach. 
-  If insurance is limited to household consumers – and even if gas-fired district heating 
and electricity supplied to households count as ‘indirect household gas consumption’ 
and are considered protected – it is unclear which country would have to change 
anything to its current policies. Even Bulgaria met its household consumption during 
the January crisis. 
-  Several countries in Europe have no or very little household consumption; should 
they be left with the option not to implement any supply security policy at all? 
-  The implicit assumption behind this approach is that involuntary interruption of gas 
supply to everything except households is not conducive to serious economic or social 
dislocation. Obviously this is not true, certainly not in every country. In some member 
states, involuntary interruption of some industrial customers would have very high 
costs. The problem remains structurally the same irrespective of what categories of 
consumers are considered ‘protected’. 
Recommendation 
The Commission should abandon the notion of ‘protected gas customers’ and embrace the 
notion of ‘contracted energy demand’. A country enjoys security of gas supply when all 
contracted energy demand can be met in the face of a gas supply disruption. 
According to this approach, the goal of the Regulation should be that member states ensure 
that peak gas consumption can either be met or erased in the face of a supply disruption: 
-  Demand can be met by alternative gas supply or alternative fuel supply; 
-  It can be erased by interruptible contracts. 
Interruptible contracts are a way to ensure security of supply; but involuntary interruption is, 
by definition, insecurity of supply. If a country complies with the EU standard while it has to 
interrupt 60% of gas consumers in case of a large-scale supply disruption, then there surely is 
a problem with the standard itself. 
The rationale for this Regulation is to force member states to devise and implement sensible 
gas supply security policies. Such a policy minimises the cost of meeting contracted energy 
demand in case of gas supply disruption. 
  4III.  THE FORMULA FOR CALCULATING N-1 LOOKS FLAWED 
There appear to be a number of inconsistencies, inaccuracies and ambiguities within the N-1 
formula which is proposed. Whilst we have already recommended that the Commission 
abandon the notion of an “N-1” formula, should it wish to retain it, the following issues must 
be addressed: 
Capacity vs. gas availability 
In the N-1 formula presented in “Annex 3” of the draft Regulation, the numerator is a mix of 
capacity measurements and actual volumes of gas which would be available for injection into 









I n  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  N - 1  f o r m u l a  i t  i s  v i tal to recognise the distinction between the 
availability of capacity and the availability of actual gas molecules. 
-  A supply disruption is not a loss of capacity but a loss of gas molecules. If a country’s 
largest incoming pipeline has a capacity of 20 mcm/d but only brings 15 mcm/day 
into the system, there is no reason why the N-1 should be calculated on the basis of 20 
mcm/d. 
-  Reciprocally, availability of capacity does not necessarily give access to alternative 
gas. Based on the formula above, a country would be “secure” as long as the sum 
capacity of its infrastructure outstripped the value of its demand, regardless of 
whether or not it had access to any gas. 
A simpler formula 
The formula given is overly complicated and ambiguous definitions could lead to improper 
usage. Simply calculating the sum of contracted gas volumes at their entry points (whether 
these are pipelines, storage facilities, production facilities or LNG regasification terminals) 
into the national system and then subtracting the single largest volume of gas to enter the 
national system and any volumes contracted to be sent out of the national system would 
provide the numerator figure needed to show what proportion of demand would need to be 




 - Sum of the maximum contracted gas injection volumes into the national system. 
 - Sum of the maximum contracted gas export volumes from the national system. 
 - Single largest contracted injection volume of natural gas into the national system. 
Clarification of denominator (gas demand) 
Dmax has been defined (Annex 3 of the draft Regulation) as “gas demand (mcm/d) related 
to periods of extreme temperature in the last 20 years, as set out in Article 5.” 
From this definition, it is unclear as to whether the “period of extreme temperatures” refers 
to the average daily demand experienced during a 7 day peak period occurring statistically 
once every twenty years or the average daily demand experienced during a 60 day peak 
period occurring statistically once every twenty years. If it is the average daily demand 
experienced during a 7 day peak period that is intended to be insured against, requiring 
member states to insure against this for 60 days would place and unnecessary burden on 
them and seems to be excessive. 
It is also important to note that insuring for either of these will not necessarily guarantee an 
ability to meet the actual peak daily demand experienced during these periods. 
Recommendation 
We advise the Commission to abandon the N-1 formula. However, if it chooses not to do this 
it should review both the numerator and denominator to ensure that: 
1.  The formula tests the ability of a national gas system to source actual quantities of gas 
in case it loses its largest inflow; 




We have not presented a comprehensive analysis of the draft Regulation that we have seen. 
Instead, we have concentrated on what seemed central to us: the dispositions that should 
translate into obligations for Member States to devise and implement adequate and sensible 
security of gas supply policies. 
To sum up our proposal, we think that the Regulation should: 
1.  Define gas supply security as a situation where all contracted final energy demand can 
be met in the face of a gas supply disruption or extreme weather events; 
2.  Mandate independent and peer-reviewed risk assessments of national gas economies 
to determine the nature of the risks to each member-state’s gas supply security; 
3.  Define a process by which, on the basis of the risk assessment, Member States 
negotiate with the Commission (supported by a panel of experts) on an appropriate 
level of ‘insurance’ translated into a legally binding National Action Plan for Gas 
Security. 
 